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THE "CONTRACT ZONING" METHOD AND
PUBLIC POLICY
In 1955, the city of Milwaukee zoned one part of a planned shop-
ping center site "neighborhood shopping," and another part "local
business." In 1961, the developers sought to have the portion of land
zoned "neighborhood shopping" rezoned to a "local business" classi-
fication so that a bowling alley could be constructed. The local home-
owners association was opposed to the zoning change, but not to the
proposed use. The homeowners and the developers consequently
entered into an agreement which provided that the land was to be
restricted only to the use of a bowling alley, provided the city approve
the application to rezone. Any other use, under the agreement, would
have to conform to those allowable under the "neighborhood shop-
ping" classification. Furthermore, the agreement provided that a
declaration of restrictions was to be recorded with the city, that the
restrictions were for the benefit of the city, and that the restrictions
were to run with the land for a period of twenty years. The city was
to have the power of enforcement by injunction. After the declara-
tion of restrictions was filed, the city rezoned the land "local business,"
and the bowling alley was constructed. However, a small parcel,
zoned "local business" but subject to the declaration of restrictions,
remained unused.
Zupancic,' the owner of the unused parcel of land, brought a man-
damus action to compel a city building inspector to issue a building
permit to construct a car wash. The permit was denied because the
proposed use did not conform to the 1961 declaration of restrictions.
Zupancic argued that the declaration of restrictions was an incident
of "contract zoning," and was therefore unenforceable. In State ex rel.
Zupancic v. Schimenz= 2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the
declaration of restrictions was valid and enforceable against the land-
owner since the "agreement was made by others than the city to con-
1. On January 1, 1968, Zupancic made an offer to purchase the small parcel,
which offer was accepted. The offer was subject to the deed restrictions of record.
Zupancic did not know of the declaration of restrictions which would not permit
a car wash, and the seller did not remember it. State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz,
46 Wis. 2d 22, 27, 174 N.W.2d 533, 536 (1970).
2. Id. at 22, 174 N.W.2d at 533.
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form the property in a way or manner which made it acceptable for
the requested rezoning and the city was not committed to rezone .... a
In urban areas today, there exists an urgent need for rational and
effective methods of dealing with city planning and development.
However, in responding to these exigencies, it is of critical importance
that legislative bodies work within their constitutional limitations.
Therefore, the implementation of new zoning techniques must be
subject to careful scrutiny. One such method, often relied upon, is
where an agreement is made to restrict the use of land between the
developer and other parties, whether they be private citizens or a
public body. Many of these situations have come to be termed "con-
tract zoning."4
Courts have been divided as to the validity of the "contract zoning"
method,5 generally basing their reasoning on public policy considera-
tions. For the most part, courts have failed to express their specific
holdings dearly, necessitating careful examination in order to dis-
tinguish certain fact patterns and frequently vague and unarticulated
policy considerations which underlie the decisions. A substantial
number of courts have struck down zoning ordinances which are sub-
ject to any restrictive conditions or concomitant agreements. 0 Other
courts have allowed certain concomitant agreements to stand if there is
no manifestation of a bargain-type situation.7 Some courts have al-
3. Id. at 30, 174 N.W.2d at 538.
4. "Contract zoning" is a descriptive phrase reflecting a melange of public policy.
For this reason, any attempt to define the concept objectively is prone to inaccura-
cies. An excellent observation on this matter is reflected in Scrutton v. County
of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969). "The phrase
'contract zoning' has no legal significance and simply refers to a reclassification
of land use in which the landowner agrees to perform conditions not imposed on
other land in the same classification. . . . It has been criticized and defended,
nullified in some states, sustained in others." Id. at 419, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
5. See R. Shapiro, The Case for Conditional Zoning, 41 Tmxr. L.Q. 267
(1968); D. Trager, Contract Zoning, 23 MD. L. Rnv. 121 (1963); Note, Zoning
Amendments and Variances Subject to Conditions, SvaAcusn L. Rav. 230 (1960);
Comment, Zoning and Concomitant Agreements, 3 GoNzAoA L. Rnv. 197 (1968);
Comment, The Use and Abuse of Contract Zoning, 12 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 897
(1965).
6. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Baylis v. City of
Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Auto-
motive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952); Midtown Prop-
erties, Inc., v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (Super. Ct.
1961), aff'd, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1963).
7. See, e.g., Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 872 (1969); Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203
N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
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lowed zoning by contract as long as there is no evidence of legislative
abuse of discretion.8 Finally, there are those courts which have in-
validated any zoning ordinance which does not permit all uses of the
land available in the designated zoning district.9
Whether the "contract zoning" method is sustained or nullified de-
pends largely on basic assumptions concerning the zoning power
which the courts must make. In Myhre v. City of Spokane,o the court
said, "[Z]oning is a discretionary exercise of police power by a legis-
lative authority. Courts will not review, except for manifest abuse,
the exercise of legislative discretion."", However, many courts have
refused to follow this basic premise expressed in Myhre and have ap-
proached zoning problems from the point of view that the power to
zone is a delegated power. In Midtown Properties, Inc., v. Township
of Madison,12 the court stated: "A municipality, in exercising the
power delegated to it must act within such delegated power and can-
not go beyond it." 3
Different jurisdictions, in considering "contract zoning" cases, have
found different expressions of overriding policy considerations which,
considered in conjunction with differing judicial approaches, have
produced varied results. In striking down "contract zoning," a num-
ber of courts have held that concomitant agreements are invalid as
not authorized by zoning enabling acts,'" while others have held that
"contract zoning" is a bargaining away of the police power.15 In
8. See, e.g., Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., v. City of Newton 344 Mass. 428
183 N.E.2d 118 (1962); Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d
270 (1963); Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
See also 3 A. RATHKOPF, TnE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 74-10 (Supp.
1970).
9. See, e.g., Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971);
Oury v. Greany, - R.I. -, 267 A.2d 700 (1970).
10. 70 Wash. 2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967).
11. Id. at 210, 422 P.2d at 792. "Manifest abuse," in the sense used in these
cases, involves any arbitrary or capricious conduct. If the validity of the zoning
reclassification is fairly debatable, it will be sustained. See, e.g., id.
12. 68 N.J. Super. 197, 172 A.2d 40 (Super. Ct. 1961) aff'd, 78 N.J. Super.
471, 189 A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1963).
13. Id. at 207, 172 A.2d at 45.
14. E.g., Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959);
Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d
118 (1962) (dissenting opinion). This argument is based on the notion that the
power to zone is a delegated power to zone by ordinance and any attempt to
zone by contractual agreement is beyond the power of the zoning authority.
15. See, e.g., Midtown Properties, Inc., v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super.
197, 172 A.2d 40 (Super. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226
(App. Div. 1963), and cases cited therein.
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Midtown Properties, the city had entered into an agreement with the
plaintiff not to rezone his property or change building code require-
ments in consideration for the donation of certain land. The New
Jersey court invalidated the agreement, stating that "the defendants
[the city] surrender[ed] their inherent power, right and duty, to keep
their zoning and planning ordinances mutable by making necessary
amendments or changes for the benefit of the public."16 Some courts
have held "contract zoning" illegal on the basis of a "spot zoning"
theory,17 which is based on the premise that legislative bodies must
rezone within a framework of a comprehensive plan "so as to confer
upon a particular parcel a particular district designation, it may not
curtail or limit the uses ... to be placed upon the lands so rezoned
differently from those permitted upon other lands in the same dis-
trict."8 Finally, there are several courts which have held that "con-
16. 1d. at 206, 172 A.2d at 45. The facts of this case disclose an impairment of
the city's police power. It is the declared policy of the state of New Jersey not to
allow bargaining of this power. "The power to zone is an exercise of police power
which the state has granted to all municipalities. This power must be exercised
in a reasonable manner and not arbitrarily, discriminately, or capriciously; and it
must be exercised so as to secure the public health, safety, morals, and wel-
fare.. . ." Id. at 207, 172 A.2d at 45.
17. See Baylis v. City of Baltimore, 219 Md. 164, 148 A.2d 429 (1959), where
the court held invalid a rezoning agreement between the landowners and the city,
recognizing a factual inconsistency of the proposed land use and the general use
designated to the district.
18. 3 A. RATH KopF, THE LAw OF ZONING AND PLANNING 74-10 (Supp. 1970).
In Oury v. Greany, - R.I. -, 267 A.2d 700 (1970), plaintiff applied to the
town council to rezone his property from "Residential" to "Business D" for the
purpose of constructing a used car lot. The application was approved but the
council also resolved that if the car lot was not built, the land would be rezoned
back to "Residential." In striking down the ordinance, the court stated that
"rezoning of residential property to a business use on the condition that the land
rezoned shall be devoted exclusively to the business use for which application to
rezone was made, or otherwise remain residential, constitutes zoning without re-
gard to the public health, safety, and welfare, concern for which is basic to that
comprehensiveness contemplated in the enabling act." Id. at -, 267 A.2d at 702.
A variation of the spot zoning theory worthy of notice is Allred v. City of Raleigh,
277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971). In Allred, the city, seeking to exercise an
element of control over a proposed high-rise apartment project, rezoned defendants'
property with the understanding that they would voluntarily submit plans and
specifications for approval by the city. These assurances were made because of
the necessity for immediate commencement of the project and the legislative delay
which would be required to pass a site plan approval ordinance. The Allred court
invalidated the ordinance, predicating the decision on the theory that a land-
owner is legally entitled to make any use of his land permissible in a designated
zoning district. There was a factual determination by the court that the council
did not decide the land justified rezoning to permit all uses, but that the rezoning
was grounded on the approval of the specific plans of defendants. The court
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tract zoning" is not in the public interest because a concomitant
agreement is not incorporated in the zoning amendment.9 "The re-
striction on property rights must be declared as a rule of law in the
ordinance and not left to the uncertainty of proof by extrinsic evi-
dence whether parol or written."2 0
In Zupancic, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly defined a
policy of that state: "[A] municipality may not surrender its govern-
mental powers and functions or thus inhibit the exercise of its police
or legislative powers." 2' But the thrust of the decision, which upheld
the declaration of restrictions, was based on the factual situation that
the city of Milwaukee was not a party to the agreement. 22 Assuming
that the court would have held the agreement illegal if the city had
been a party, a drastically different result, based solely on the issue of
privity, would have occurred. In light of Wisconsin's declared policy,
the rule expressed in Zupancic23 is highly questionable. The court
made no attempt to substantiate factually whether there was an im-
pairment of the city's police power. Ignoring the view advanced by
Zupancic that the facts of the case gave rise to a quid pro quo, the
court stated, "[W'Xhile this view of invalidity is taken by the courts in
New Jersey, Maryland, Michigan, and Florida, we think this is a too
rigid view.'"2'
The Zupancic court cites with approval Church v. Town of Islip,25
a case dealing with a zoning change conditioned on recording of re-
held that "[rlezoning on consideration of assurances that a particular tract or
parcel will be developed in accordance with restricted approved plans is not a
permissible ground for placing the property in a zone where restrictions of the
nature prescribed are not otherwise required or contemplated." Id. at 545, 178
S.E.2d at 441.
19. See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1956); Sylvania Electric
Products, Inc., v. City of Newton, 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E.2d 118 (1962) (dis-
senting opinion); Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Ass'n,
9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d 319 (1952).
20. Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956).
21. 46 Wis. 2d at 28, 174 N.W.2d at 537.
22. Id. at 29, 174 N.W.2d at 537. "In the instant case, there is no agreement
with the city. Neither its common council nor the city plan commission agreed to
rezone." Id. at 28, 174 N.W.2d at 537.
23. We hold that when a city itself makes an agreement with a landowner to
rezone the contract is invalid; this is contract zoning. However, when the
agreement is made by others than the city to conform the property in a way
or manner which makes it acceptable for the requested rezoning and the city
is not committed to rezone, it is not contract zoning ....
Id. at 30, 174 N.W.2d at 538.
24. Id. at 32, 174 N.W.2d at 539.
25. 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1960).
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strictive covenants. However, the Church approach to the "contract
zoning" problem is very different from that in Zupancic. The founda-
tion of Church is that zoning is a legislative act entitled to the strong-
est possible presumption of validity, if there is any factual basis for
it.26 The court upheld the ordinance, stating:
Surely these conditions were intended for the benefit of the neigh-
bors. Since the town board could have, presumably, zoned [the]
corner for business without any restrictions, we fail to see how
reasonable conditions invalidate the legislation. Since the owners
have accepted them, there is no one in a position to contest them.
All contract zoning is invalid in the sense that a legislature can-
not bargain away or sell its powers. But we deal here with actuali-
ties not phrases.27 (Emphasis added)
Church succinctly expresses the crux of the "contract zoning" prob-
lem: "actualities not phrases." This scrutinizing approach has re-
cently been articulated in Scrutton v. County of Sacramento.2 In
Scrutton, the county approved a zoning change subject to conditions
of land dedication and street paving at the owner's expense. The
California court upheld this procedure notwithstanding the absence
of an express agreement, reasoning that
when the zoning agency exacts a concomitant contract from the
landowner, it holds out an implied or moral assurance that it will
not quickly reverse or alter its decision. In a sense this assurance
tends to freeze the property's status. The suspension of continu-
ing police power is theoretical rather than real .... The contract
zoning procedure pursued here entails neither a formal nor a
practical surrender of the police power.29 (Emphasis added)
The facts in Zupancic are nearly identical to those in Bucholz v.
City of Omaha,8 0 where landowners applied to the council for rezon-
ing and the council ordered protective covenants submitted before
rezoning would be approved. The Nebraska court, expressing a policy
of the state, declared that "a city has no right or power to enter into
contracts which curtail or prohibit an exercise of its legislative or
administrative authority."81 However, the court concluded that "the
evidence in this case does not show a bargain or agreement between
26. Id. at 258, 168 N.E.2d at 682, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
27. Id. at 259, 168 N.E.2d at 683, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 869.
28. 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
29. Id. at 419-20, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
30. 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270 (1963).
31. Id. at 873, 120 N.W.2d at 277.
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the applicants and the city. There is evidence that the applicants
made certain representations to the city council." 32 (Emphasis added)
In Church, Bucholz, Scrutton, and Zupancic, there are expressed
policies against bargaining police power. However, the Church,
Bucholz, and Scrutton courts, unlike the Zupancic court, have spe-
cifically required evidence of bargaining. Bucholz, in line with Scrut-
ton and Church, permits a determination of "contract zoning" cases
on their merits on a case by case basis. The Zupancic approach, how-
ever, forces a decision based on a neat dichotomy of form and not
substance: agreements with the city are invalid; agreements with the
neighbors (private individuals) are valid. The Zupancic court has
dealt with phrases, not actualities.
The strong probability that the city of Milwaukee would not have
rezoned the land to a "local business" classification if the declaration
of restrictions had not been filed is very important to the actuality
of a bargain, yet the Zupancic court refused to consider this aspect,
undoubtedly relevant under the Church or Bucholz approach. In-
stead of examining the record for evidence of a bargain, the Wiscon-
sin court speaks of the fiction that a zoning authority is "motivated"
to zone by the "voluntary" filing of restrictions by the owner.3 3 As a
practical matter, to distinguish between "bargain language" and "mo-
tivation-inducement language" is simply a problem in semantics.34
Under the Zupancic holding, it will now be possible for a Wisconsin
municipality to violate the state's no-bargain policy by subtly suggest-
ing to an applicant for rezoning that he and the neighbors "talk it
over" and that he "voluntarily" submit a declaration of restrictions.
Since there would be no agreement with the city, there would be no
"contract zoning." It is clear that under these circumstances, the hold-
ing in Zupancic is inflexible.
Zupancic is an attempt to provide a workable tool for problems in
32. Id.
33. 46 Wqis. 2d at 29, 174 N.W.2d at 537.
34. Since on almost every application for a downzoning, the applicant is re-
quired to state the specific use and method of use which he would make of the
property, were his application granted, it would be difficult to draw the line be-
tween valid and invalid conditions on the basis of who initiated the discussion as
to conditions, i.e., whether on his application the applicant offered to submit to cer-
tain limitations upon the general rights conferred by the new zoning classification
or whether these limitations were demanded by the legislative body. 3 A. RATH-
xopp, THE LAw OF ZoNNo AND PLANNING 74-10 (Supp. 1970).
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urban change by encouraging private agreements limiting land use.s5
While a practical method is needed for solving these problems,
Zupancic has not gone far enough.36 The court, while recognizing
the validity of private agreements, and rejecting public agreements,
has furnished zoning boards with a vague and possibly unjust rule
with built-in methods of abuse. Courts in the future should recognize
the public policy considerations at the heart of their rules, and base
the validity or invalidity of public and private zoning agreements on
actualities, not phrases.
Steven B. Fishman
35. The court implied that the use of restrictive agreements in zoning were
possibly of some importance if kept within certain limitations, stating that
"[c]ontract zoning is illegal not because of the result but because of the method."
46 Wis. 2d at 28, 174 N.W.2d at 537.
36. "The virtue of allowing private agreements to underlie zoning is the flexi-
bility and control of the development given to a municipality to meet the ever-
increasing demands for a rezoning in a rapidly changing area." Id. at 29, 174
N.W.2d at 537.
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